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Wrongful Life-Impaired Infant's Cause of
Action Recognized: Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories
Wrongful life1 actions in behalf of physically or mentally
impaired infants have been consistently barred in all jurisdicAlthough the factual
tions where brought,' including Calif~rnia.~
contexts have varied, the courts have uniformly held that the
infant plaintiffs have suffered no injury cognizable at law.' The
1. The term "wrongful life" has been applied to both infants' and parents' causes of
action in various factual contexts since 1963. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d
240, 190 N.E. 2d 849,appeal denied, 27 Ill. 2d 626 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964) (healthy infant sued father because infant was born an adulterine bastard);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967) (parents and defective infant sued
physician for failure to inform parents of possible birth defects); Speck v. Finegold, 408
A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (parents and defective infant sued physician for unsuccessful sterilization and abortion). Regardless of the context, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant either failed to prevent the infant's birth or denied the parents their right to
prevent it. Most courts today limit their usage of "wrongful life" to actions brought in
behalf of the infant and distinguish the parents' action for the same wrong as one for
"wrongful birth" or "wrongful conception." See, eg., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 423,
404 A.2d 8, 9-10 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). The
case which is the subject of this Casenote limits the term wrongful life "to thcauses
of action brought by the infant alleging that, due to the negligence of the defendant,
b i i occurred." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 817, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 481, hearing denied, No. 2 Civ. 68192 Div. 1 (Cal. Sept. 4, 1980).
Care should be taken to distinguish wrongful life causes of action from prenatal tort
claims. While wrongful life actions have been consistently denied, prenatal tort claims
are commonly recognized by the courts. See 43 C.J.S. Infants 8 219 (1978). The plaintiff
in a prenatal tort case alleges not that he was wrongfully born, but that absent the defendant's negligence either prior to conception or during pregnancy, he would have been
born normal and healthy. E.g., Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (infant stated cause of action for injuries resulting from negligent Caesarean section on the
mother two years before infant's birth). In a wrongful life case there is no claim that the
defendant caused or increased the risk of the infant's defect, only that he failed to prevent the infant's birth. Eg., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 427, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Elliott v.
Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ah. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
3. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). "No court has
yet recognized the tort [citation omitted], and we are not persuaded that this court
should be the first." Id. at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
4. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,429,404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Speck v. F i e gold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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courts have concluded that it is impossible to determine whether
nonexistence is preferable to impaired life and therefore whether
impaired life represents a compensable injury.' The court in
Curlender u. Bio-Science Laboratories6 perceived no such impossibility and, holding contrary to every other standing decision on wrongful life, recognized the infant plaintiffs cause of
action. The California Supreme Court's denial of the defendants'
petition for hearing suggests that the decision is more than a
mere aberration.?
In 1977, Hyam and Phillis Curlender retained the defendant
laboratories to perform blood tests designed to reveal whether
they carried genes that could cause Tay-Sachs disease8 in their
offspring. Relying on the defendants' negative findings: Mrs.
Curlender conceived and gave birth to the plaintiff, Shauna.
Shortly after her birth, doctors found that Shauna had TaySachs disease. The impaired infant, by and through her father,
filed a complaint for wrongful lifel0 against the testing laboratories, alleging that their negligence in giving "incorrect and inaccurate" information to her parents was the proximate cause of
her birth and subsequent suffering.ll
The defendants demurred to the complaint, arguing that
5. See note 35 infra.
6. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,165 Cal. Rptr. 477, hearing denied, No. 2 Civ. 58192 Div. 1
(Cal. Sept. 4, 1980).
7. The petition for hearing was denied September 4, 1980. No. 2 Civ. 58192 Div. 1
(Cal. Sept. 4, 1980). For interpretation of such a denial, see Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46
Cal. App. 3d 346, 351, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 60 (1975) (quoting Di Genova v. State Bd. of
Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1962)) (although
denial does not express approval, it is "not without significance"); Allstot v. Long Beach,
104 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 231 P.2d 498, 501 (1951) (denial means lower court did not
decide incorrectly). But see People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 890, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 106
Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1973) (under some circumstances such a denial "is to be given no
weight").
8. A fatal, hereditary disease of the nervous system that develops soon after birth
and has a 25% probability of occurring in the offspring of Eastern European Jewish
parents when both are carriers of Tay-Sachs genes.
9. The defendants allegedly represented to the plaintiffs parents that only one of
them carried Tay-Sachs genes and thus dispelled their concern about possibly impaired
offspring. Opening Brief for Appellant a t 3, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106
Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
10. The "wrongful life" characterization of the action was applied by both the trial
court and court of appeal. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 817,165 Cal. Rptr. at 481. A simultaneous
action for "wrongful birth" was filed by the infant's parents. Id. a t 817 n.7, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 481 n.7. See also Opening Brief for Appellant at 5 n.1. Both actions allege that if
the parents had been informed of the probability of impaired offspring they would have
prevented conception or obtained an abortion.
11. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
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Stills v. Gratton12 was controlling. Stills denied wrongful life recovery to a healthy infant born following an unsuccessful abortion, because his only injury was illegitimate birth. The trial
court in Curlender sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend and dismissed the complaint. Because of this procedural
disposition, the court of appeal accepted as true all material
facts properly pleaded? Therefore, negligence was presumed,
and the only question was whether the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action.
The court of appeal determined that Stills was not controlling and treated the Curlender case as one of first impression.14
The court reasoned that the Stills infant was born healthy and
thus suffered no injury; whereas the Curlender infant was born
with painful defects, a very real injury." With Stills distinguished, the court went on to hold that the defendants had
breached a duty of reasonable care owed directly to the not-yetconceived infant and that the breach had resulted in the plaintiffs birth with painful defects.16 The difficult question was
whether that injury is cognizable at law.'' Holding that it is, the
court reasoned that a wrongful life plaintiff does not claim a
right not to be born;18 therefore, it is immaterial that the plaintiff would not exist absent the defendants' negligence,ls and no
comparison of nonlife to impaired life is necessary. What is important, reasoned the court, is that "a plaintiff both exists and
suffers, due to the negligence of others,'n0 and so "may recover
from the person in fault a compensation therefor.'"' Thus the
court subordinated the difficult metaphysical questions of
wrongful life recovery to "the principle that there should be a
remedy for every wrong ~ommitted."~~
The Curlender court characterized Shauna's injury as birth
with defects," but then focused on the pain and suffering of the
12. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rtpr. 652 (1976) (the only California wrongful l i e
case prior to Curlender).
13. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
14. Id. at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
15. Id. at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
16. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
19. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89 (quoting CAI,. CIV. CODE5 3281 (West1970)).
22. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
23. Id. at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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defects while ignoring the noncognizable nature of the birth.
This characterization gave the injury the appearance of a cognizable prenatal tort and freed the court to allow recovery. This
analysis and treatment of the injury led the court to an erroneous distinction of Stills, a questionable conclusion on causation,
and a judicial declaration that nonlife may he preferable to a life
with defects.
The rationale given in Stills for denial of the infant's claim
was not that he had suffered no injury, but that the injury he
had suffered was not cognizable at law." In Zepeda v. Z e p e d ~ , ~ '
which also denied a healthy, illegitimate infant's cIaim of wrongful life, the court outlined the disadvantages of illegitimacy and
observed that "it would be pure fiction to say that the plaintiff
suffers no injury."26 The infant's claim in each case was denied
because the negligence complained of resulted not only in their
illegitimacy, but also in their life; and to compensate impaired
life would have "vast" legal implications and a "staggering" social impact.07
Wrongful life cases present the difficult question of whether
the defendant, who concededly caused the birth, can also be said
to have caused the defect that accompanied the birth. Although
the Curlender court found causation by treating the birth and
defect jointly as one injury? other courts distinguish the two
elements and refuse to attribute the defect to the defendant's
the infant alleged through her
conduct. In Berman v. Allan,m@
guardian ad litem that she was born with Down's Syndrome due
to the defendant doctors' failure to inform her parents of the
availability of amniocentesis. In denying her action, the court
noted that the defendants neither caused "the mongoloid condition nor increased the risk that such a condition would occur."S0
The court in Becker v. SchwartzS1reached the same conclusion
24. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705-06, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
25. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, appeal denied, 27 Ill. 2d 626 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
26. Id. at 255, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
27. 55 Cal.App. 3d at 705, 127 Cal.Rptr. at 656 (quoting 41 Ill. App. 2d at 258, 190
N.E.2d at 858). Zepeda warned that recovery would encourage litigation by "all others
born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse." 41 Ill. App. 2d at
260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
28. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
29. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
30. Id. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11.
31. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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on similar facts.82 One justice, concurring with the majority on
this issue, observed: "The heart of the problem in these cases is
that the physician cannot be said to have caused the defect. The
disorder is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently
Thus, while the Curlender concept of
inflicted by the doct~r.'"~
a "causal link"" between the negligence and the defect is plausible, most courts, like Berman and Becker, employ the language
of "proximate cause" or "cause in fact." In these more common
terms the defendants' conduct is superseded by the parents' own
genes as the cause of the defect, and the finding of causation in
Curlender becomes questionable.
Whether the defendant laboratories "caused" only the
plaintiffs birth or whether they "caused" the plaintiffs birth
with defects, the court erred in declaring the injury cognizable at
law. To award damages for impaired life is to make the determination that nonlife is preferable, and that determination requires a comparison between nonlife and impaired life that no
court is capable of making. Such a comparison "transcends the
mechanical application of legal principle^"^^ and would be better
left to "the representatives of the people."s6
The Curlender court misinterpreted this judicial reluctance
to attempt a comparison of nonlife and impaired life as an inability to measure damagess7and argued that such an excuse is
insufficient to bar recovery to an injured plaintiff. However, the
reason for denial of wrongful life claims is not so much the diffi32. Id. at 410-11, 386 N.E.2d at 811-12, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
33. Id. at 418, 386 N.E.2d at 816, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (Wachtler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Accord, Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654,655 (N.D.
Ohio 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 770-71, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374
(1975).
34. 106 Cal. kpp. 3d at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
35. 46 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810,413 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The Stills court concluded: "The issue involved is more theological or philosophical than legal." 55 Cal. App.
3d at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656. See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d
689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part). "Ultimately, the infant's complaint
is that he would be better off not to have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death
or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is so." Id.
36. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at 263, 190 N.E.2d at 859. Accord, Park v.
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 91-92, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116-17 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting),
modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Cf. Speck v. Finegold,
408 A.2d 496, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (discusses how wrongful death was first recognized through the legislature rather than through the courts).
37. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (interpretation of rationale in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)); Id. at 824-25, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
486 (interpretation of rationale in Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1976)).
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culty of measuring or computing damagess8as it is the difficulty
of determining whether damages are due. If courts could determine that an infant has suffered a compensable injury by being
born, mere difficulty in computing damages "would not bar
re~overy."~~
Some commentators concede that the injury alleged in
wrongful life cases is birth, but suggest that courts should not
blindly presume that life is always preferable to nonlife.'O They
cite recent right-to-die cases4' as evidence of a new willingness
by the courts to conclude that under some circumstances nonlife
or death is preferable to a painful, miserable life. However, a
closer comparison of the two types of cases reveals a lifetime of
difference.
Right-to-die cases normally deal with noncognitive, vegetative patients who are being kept "alive" by various artificial instruments. The issue is not their preference (nor their guardian's
preference) for death, but rather their right of privacy, their
right to be free from nonconsensual invasion of their bodily int e g r i t ~ As
. ~ ~the condition worsens and more artificial intervention is required, a point is reached where the individual's right
of privacy exceeds the state's interest in preserving life." At that
point courts recognize a right to die. By constrast, since a wrongful life plaintiff complains of life, he necessarily claims a right
not to be born? a right which no court has recogni~ed.~~
38. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hap., 451 F. Supp. 692,694 (E.D.
Pa. 1978)
(also involved an infant born with Tay-Sachs); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 428-29,404
A.2d 8, 12 (1979); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 483-84, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (1966).
39. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 80-81 n.3, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 n.3 (1977).
L. REV.257, 263-64 (1979); Comment,
40. Comment, Berman v. Allan, 8 HOPSTRA
"Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL.L. REV.480, 496-98 (1980); Note,
A Cause of Action For "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN.
L. REV.58,
65-66 (1970).
41. See, eg., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
42. "It ia the issue of the constitutional right of privacy that has given us most concern, in the exceptional circumstances of this case." I n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38, 355
A.2d at 662.
43. Id. a t 40-41, 355 A.2d a t 664.
44. Curlender erroneously denied that such a claim was at issue. 106 Cal. App. 3d at
830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
45. "Fundamental to the recognition of such a cause of action is the notion that the
defendant has violated some legal right of plaintiff's . . . . However, a legal right not to
be born is alien to the public policy of this State to protect and preserve human life."
Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 ( A h 1978). Accord, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
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Furthermore, a court's order granting permission to remove
artificial life supports is not a judicial declaration that death is
preferable to a vegetative existence, but merely a granting of
agency allowing an individual to thus exercise his rights if he so
chooses. There is no compulsion, and no monetary award nor
compensation is involved. By contrast, when a court awards
damages to an impaired infant born because of negligence, it
rules that the defendants should have prevented the birth and
that nonlife would have been preferable. In other words, allowance of wrongful life recovery prefers nonlife by penalizing the
failure to prevent life. Allowing a person to choose to die states
no preference and penalizes no one."
One of the most dangerous effects of the Curlender decision
is its possible impact on parents' rights and family relationships.
By declaring impaired life a cognizable injury, the court opened
the door to suits by impaired children against their parents.
Curlender called such a concern "gro~ndless,"~~
but in the same
paragraph the court conceded that if parents are adequately informed of the risks of impaired offspring and then choose to
conceive and give life anyway, "we see no sound public policy
which should protect those parents from being answerable'' to
their offspring? Fear of a lawsuit could deter from parenthood
those persons who desire to accept the known risks of bearing
impaired children4@
and thus infringes their right of procreative
choice. Such persons, if they did conceive and were informed of
an impaired fetus, could be forced into an abortion to avoid the
potential costs of litigation and thus forced as well against their
These concerns are valid, not
possible religious convi~tions.~~
"groundless."
The Curlender court was motivated in its decision by a desire to deter negligent genetic counseling and by the moral principle that every wrong should have a remedy. However, both
401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
46. The courts also distinguish between the two types of actions. The same court
that granted the right to die in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976), also denied the infant's claim of wrongful life in Berman v. Allan three
years later. See also Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of
Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALEL.J. 1488, 1502 n.56 (1978).
47. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
48. Id.
49. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
50. Brief of Amici Curiae at 16-17, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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ends may be satisfied without granting recovery to the infant.
The parents of the Curlender infant brought a separate action
in their own behalf for "wrongful birth."51 Unlike wrongful life
actions, such parental actions are commonly recognized in CaliThis wide acceptance indicates
fornia5' and other jurisdi~tions.~~
that most courts consider recovery of damages by the parents as
adequately satisfying the requirements of both deterrence and
justice.
Some would argue that allowing only the parents to recover
still leaves uncompensated the pain and suffering of the impaired infant.- However, the law has long recognized that some
of life's adversities will always to uncompensated as damnum
absque injuria, damage without wrong.55 The fact that a complainant may have suffered is not enough. There must be a violation of a legal right or there is no cause of action. As the court
noted in Howard u. Lecher? "Ideally, there should be a remedy
for every wrong. This is not the function of the law, however, for
'[elvery injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of
the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.' ""

Merrill F. Nelson

51. Opening Brief for Appellant at 5 n.1.
52. In both Stills and Custodio v. Baur, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967), the parents were allowed recovery for all consequential damages.
53. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (Tay-Sachs case in which the parents were allowed recovery while the infant's action was denied); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
54. This is not entirely true since the typical juror may have in mind the pain and
suffering of the infant when determining a fair award for the parenta.
2d Actions § 70 (1962).
55. 1AM. JUR.
56. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Tay-Sachs case that
denied parents damages for emotional suffering; lower court's grant of medical costs and
funeral expenses was not appealed).
57. Id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d a t 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969)).

